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HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND.

Translated from the German* of K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

It was natural that during Hegel's intimate association with Schelling, his expression should become somewhat colored by the latter, in whom we may observe the converse of this influence. When Schelling left Jena in the spring of 1803, Hegel returned more to his own individuality. He resumed also the collegia which he had somewhat neglected during his activity as an author. He lectured especially upon logic and metaphysics, and also upon a philosophical encyclopaedia, *totam philosophiæ scientiam, philosophiam logices, naturæ et mentis*. This distinguished him from Schelling, who did not lecture at all upon logic or metaphysics, and had critically treated the various philosophical sciences, only once, in the lectures on the methods of academic study. A systematic totality was what lay at Hegel's heart. He collected himself gradually for its production, and intended to bring it out in two parts, of which the first was to contain a critical justification of his stand-point, and the second the system itself. The first only, at the close of his abode in Jena, was brought to press, and appeared in Bamberg, 1807: "The Phenomenology of Mind, or the Science of the Experience of Consciousness."

This work included, first, the theory of consciousness; second, a critical review of history, to see at what result the history of mankind has arrived in respect to science. It united psychology with the philosophy of history. Hence it has been called a psychology confused by history, or a history distracted by psychology. It is easy to represent it as a monstrosity if narrow criteria are applied, but the inner unity of Hegel's thought was to have consciousness criticise itself by its development, not only in respect to form, but in respect to contents. The title "Science of Consciousness" indicates the content. The mind of mankind itself is summoned to state what form of consciousness it assumes as present, as now final. The chief title "Phenomenology of

* A chapter from "Hegel als Deutscher National Philosoph," Leipzig, 1870.

Mind" recalls the phenomenology of Lambert's "Organon." Mind advances in its consciousness from step to step. Each lower stage is shown upon the next higher to have been a relative error, but it is not therefore nothing, but a necessary condition of the higher. This, when it is entered upon, seems to be the highest, but progress reduces this to a mere seeming. It is therefore not entirely false, but only relatively so, in that it was taken as ultimate. In designating the phenomenology as that of *mind*, Hegel indicates the difference which existed between himself and Fichte, Schelling, and previous philosophers in general. In a former treatise upon natural right Hegel had brought the conception of mind into prominence, and had said that it stood higher than nature, while Schelling made nature and mind parallel as coördinate factors of the absolute indifference. The conception of mind had hitherto been treated under the conception of reason, consciousness, thinking, and willing, but not in and for itself, not as an adequate conception of the absolute. Reason and nature are presuppositions which mind makes for itself, but which, as Hegel says, it overreaches. Reason, Nature and Mind are mutually coördinated in their independence as *idea* in general. In respect to compass, reason is ranked above nature and mind; but in respect to content, reason is put with and in nature, and nature with and in mind. Nature is rational, but it is something other than mere reason, for it becomes specific in gases, metals, earths, plants, animals, and constellations. Mind is also in itself rational, but through consciousness it is free from the power of nature, and uses the latter as the organ for realizing its purposes, and thereby spiritualizes it. In its history it annuls nature. It is higher than nature because it is the highest, the absolute in aggregate, which knows itself as truth. Hegel's Phenomenology is the preliminary conclusion of the transformations which had begun with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. This critique was no psychology or logic or metaphysics in the sense of school-wisdom; it was all these, yet was nothing of them all; it was one of those anomalous products which appear at epochal points in the development of mind, and in which the past is concluded and a new future is ushered in. Kant's Critique, although no definite science, was the foundation of

the great modern revolution of philosophy; Fichte's doctrine of knowledge and Schelling's system of transcendental idealism were its consequences. Hegel's *Phenomenology*, after many intermediate formations, is also a result of the same, an analogue of Kant's *Critique*, and, like it, the source of a new movement.

The *Phenomenology* may be and has been called the propædæutics of Hegel's system; but the name is appropriate only so far as he sought therein to lay the foundations of his stand-point: it must not indicate, as it usually does, a philosophizing outside of philosophy, which is to make the latter easier, to introduce it by gentle gradations, or as far as possible to economize individual thought. On the contrary, the *Phenomenology* is very difficult, for it is still more profound than Kant's *Critique*, than Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*, or than Schelling's *Transcendental Idealism*. The two latter were the immediate and extended consequents of Kant's *Critique*, and are in so far transition stadia from Kant to Hegel. At the same time the relation of the *Phenomenology* to the *Critique of Pure Reason* is most intimate, as is manifest in the first words of the introduction, which commences thus: "It is a natural notion that in philosophy, before the subject-matter itself—namely, the real knowledge of that which in truth is—be entered upon, it is previously necessary to arrive at an understanding concerning the faculty of knowing, which is regarded as the tool by which man possesses himself of the absolute, or as the medium through which he describes it. This solicitude seems to be justified partly by the fact that there are different kinds of knowledge, and among them one may be better adapted than another to the attainment of this ultimate end, so that a false choice may be made among them; moreover, partly by the fact that, since knowledge is a faculty of a definite kind and compass, clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth will result unless a more accurate determination of its nature and boundary is accomplished." It is impossible in these words, and in the entire subsequent exposition, not to detect constantly implied allusions to Kant's stand-point in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, although Kant is not named. Hegel decidedly dissents, toward the end of the introduction, from the view that phenomenology is a mere

preface, outside of philosophy. For consciousness which is established in its phenomenal form, that which arises through its own mutations is ever another object. But for our consciousness which detects the becoming of phenomenal consciousness from stage to stage, this movement itself becomes an object of our knowledge. Hence Hegel says: "Through this necessity this way to science is itself already science, and, on account of its content, science of the experience of consciousness."

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason began with transcendental æsthetics, with the receptivity of intuitions of space and time, and ascended through understanding of the analytic logic to the dialectic of reason, to the ideal finality of speculative theology. It ended with the result that the absolute object is incomprehensible to us, since the intelligence of the understanding cannot be adequately applied to the conceptions of reason, but can be brought into relation only to phenomena. Hegel began in the same way with sensuous certainty, which comes to intuition here in space and time. From this, like Kant, he ascended to the absolute, but differed from him in affirming the possibility of absolute knowledge. The final result of the *Phenomenology* is exactly opposite to that of the Critique. The interval between sensuous certainty as the beginning, and absolute knowledge as the end, has of course an entirely different content from the interval between Kant's transcendental æsthetics and the ideal finality of theology. It should be well observed that Hegel regarded absolute knowledge as the limit of the development of consciousness. Not a negative limit, such as, according to Kant, the understanding opposes from fear of the truth of reason, but the positive limit of the highest satisfaction of consciousness, beyond which a higher is impossible; for only the absolute is true, but only the true is absolute. Hegel makes consciousness advance by its own dialectic from one stand-point to another; sensuous certainty makes it have to do, not only with this single object, here and now, but, as soon as it attempts to say what it feels, tastes, hears, &c., this must resolve itself into generality. The predicate which it utters of the object as its essence, is a generality which, as such, is not sensuous. The sensuousness of the certainty thereby

sublates [annuls] itself; while consciousness is driven onward from the unit (as this being) to generality, another and new stand-point arises. And thus it proceeds from stand-point to stand-point. Formally, the same process is ever repeated for us, but not to the infinite, not progressively to the endless, but with a distinct conclusion in absolute knowledge, in which being and intelligence mutually cover each other. In knowledge of the truth, mind first finds, not the rest of the church-yard, but a rest which is vital and full of content. Science is therefore the absolute power in human life, against which all opposition is vain. What sense has once demonstrated, gradually makes its way as law into the knowledge, and finally into the action, of the people. No polity, no religion avails against it. Copernicus overthrew the mediæval heaven with his solar system. The Pope contradicted him for centuries, until in 1821 he was obliged expressly to recognize the Copernican system. Buckle, in his history of civilization in England, made the assertion that mankind advance in knowledge, but not in morals. This I regard an error, for it is impossible that the knowledge of truth should not tend to make men both freer and better. "Know the truth, and it shall make you free," said Christ.

Since, then, the phenomenology is the science of the experience of consciousness, it nevertheless stands at variance with the conception of science, in that it transposes and adulterates it with historical elements.

Attention must now be drawn to the reproach always urged with so much emphasis, that in the *Phenomenology* Hegel nowhere mentions the name of a philosopher, a people, or an event. He allows each stand-point to characterize itself with relative absoluteness. Nevertheless it is unmistakable that he has in mind distinct historical phenomena. Does he employ them, as it were, by chance, as we select any example to illustrate an abstract proposition by a concrete notion? By no means; but we observe that he fixes upon such a phenomenon as can validate itself in universal history as the classic type of the stand-point which is to be elucidated. He borrows his colors from it because they are the most striking and expressive. From the peculiar collusion of this view in the background, with the conception of the particular stages

of consciousness in the foreground, springs that charm of exposition which the *Phenomenology* has ever exerted upon the temper of those who were cultured enough to enjoy it. Hegel gives no illustrations in a dry, scholastic manner, yet we do not miss that insight which we seek in illustration. Hegel must not be understood as though he would say that the general stand-point which he describes is present only among this people, in this condition, at this epoch of history; his meaning is, that that which occurs in and for itself in the development of consciousness, as a necessary moment of its becoming, has attained in this form of historical phenomenon its purest objectivity. When, for example, in the conception of the ethical mind, the Hellenic world seems to glimmer through, it should not be understood that he abstracted the conception of ethics from the history of the Greeks, and therefore adduces it here; but this conception is in and for itself universal, and is therefore found, as an essential element, among other people, although among the Greeks in its most pregnant beauty and truth. This procedure is therefore by no means wrong, but is in most exquisite taste.

One should first attempt to understand the *Phenomenology* from itself, rather than apply to it the criterion which Hegel has given in the preface, which is swollen to the length of a formal treatise. Prefaces are ordinarily printed before the work itself, but are written only after it is completed. It is quite right that the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology* should have been regarded as his manifesto against the excesses of romanticism, and the degeneracies of Schelling's natural philosophy; but the consciousness to which Hegel has given utterance could arise only after the completion of the *Phenomenology*. We shall, therefore, speak of it later.

The more obscure and confused the conceptions which are wont to be made of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, the more necessary it becomes briefly to review its outlines, though it is a work so peculiar, that, before conclusions are reached, it must be made familiar in the originality of its earliest form. Hegel distinguished as the most general determinations—(1) consciousness; (2) self-consciousness; (3) reason. Consciousness is knowledge which has for its object that existence which is given it through mediation of the senses: (a) as

sensuous certainty; (b) as perception; (c) as understanding. —Sensuous certainty takes the individual thing as truth; but as soon as it undertakes to say what the thing *in se* is, it finds itself compelled to utter a generality concerning it. It supposed itself concerned now and here, and with this which presents itself immediately as an exclusive unit, but in this unit the universal is at the same time contained. To this, consciousness must accordingly direct itself as the truth. It becomes perceptive to discern the properties of the thing in which their generality inheres. Things are what they are through their properties, but at the same time they dissolve themselves through these, for through these they cohere with other things, and in this coherence they undergo change. The force which determines things is, therefore, a new object for consciousness; the latter becomes understanding in that it searches out the laws which preside over the play of forces. These laws, in their immutability, as contrasted with things, constitute a supersensuous world.

Consciousness has thus advanced from sensuous certainty to the certainty of the understanding, that within the sensuous the supersensuous, viz. law, is truth proper. Rather, it is itself the supersensuous; for that which knows laws is not an object of sense, has no properties which can dissolve themselves, but makes itself its own object. It is thus self-consciousness, in which are distinguished, (a) its independence; (b) its freedom. It is independent in so far as it subjects life, with its passions and lusts, to itself; dependent, in so far as, conversely, it subjects its own self to life and its passions and lusts. But how does it learn this distinction? Not by distinguishing itself, within itself, from itself, as ego; nor by distinguishing the likeness of the ego from life and its manifold passions and lusts; but by coming to itself in another ego, and entering upon a life and death conflict with it: for thus alone can it become truly self-certain, both whether it has exalted itself above the attachment to life, and whether the opposing consciousness has done so. Should either self-consciousness renounce the conflict, or fear death, or cherish life more than self, in so doing it unselfs itself, becomes dependent, subject to another self, and degrades itself to the service of a lord. This conflict for recognition, to find self for

others its like, is the origin of the relation of servitude and dominion. This position of Hegel has often been invidiously perverted into the doctrine that slavery is a righteous necessity, which he never intended. It is generally said that slavery originated in the captures of warfare. Hegel goes deeper, and inquires how there arose the subjection of one man to another. He answers, "From the want of self-subsistence in self-consciousness." And, "Whence arises this?" he inquires. "From fear of death, from the subjection of self to life."—Hegel develops the mysterious ethico-psychological process from which the fact of slavery arises. By culture, the slave can gradually make himself worthy to be recognized by his master as independent; he gives him freedom because it is already present in him. The freedom of self-consciousness lies in its self-determination as a thinking will. It appears, according to Hegel, in the forms (a) of stoicism; (b) of skepticism; (c) of unhappy consciousness.

Stoicism retires from all reality into the purity of thinking, into the thought of freedom, to which no access from without can be obtained, and in which it is indifferent whether the subject exists as servant or sovereign; for, though in chains, it can still think. Skepticism, conversely, frees itself from the pressure of reality by construing it as mere appearance, as a turmoil of contradictions. Nevertheless it adapts itself to the dominant order of things, which for it is a falsehood. It subjects itself to a reality which is naught to it, since of every distinction which empiricism can find, its opposite exists. The repose of the stoic, and the unrest of the skeptic, absorbed in the detection of contradictions, coalesce in the unhappy consciousness, which, from the unrest of the phenomenal world as the Present, rises to the rest of the Beyond as its true essence, but from this exaltation sinks back again into itself. The Essence which is in the Beyond is universal, immutable; that which is here, on the other hand, as an individual is exposed to mutation. It attempts by labor to escape the sundering of the Present and the Beyond; but labor augments its independence, its property, its enjoyment. Hence it thanks the Eternal for what is mutable; it renounces the attempt to bring itself into harmony with its activity; but, while it thanks, it acquits itself of its obligation to the Im-

mutable, for thereby it recognizes the latter, and returns to its individuality. To express the same still more earnestly, it makes sacrifice of its possession through the priests of the Immutable, who, in place of the latter, receive his gift. But the priest, who renders thanks in its name, is no more the Immutable than the sacrifice is the individual who offers it through the priest. Hence self-consciousness denies itself the enjoyment of the gifts which the Immutable presents it; it fasts, chastises itself, and finally, in order spiritually to annihilate itself, allows itself to be determined by priests as the council of its conscience. In order to be free from itself, it has renounced its freedom of self-determination, and acts as the slave of priests. It is unhappy, for it is broken down; and does not escape from itself even when it surrenders itself to authority, for it must resolve to do even this. It must will to be unselfed.

But since the Beyond is pure thought, no less so than self-consciousness, it experiences that, at bottom, the Immutable is united in itself with the Mutable; and that the Eternal, which seemed to be a Beyond, is really present in the Here. This consciousness of the unity of the idea and its reality is reason. Rational self-consciousness is, according to Hegel, (1) certainty of the truth of reason; (2) mind; (3) religion; (4) absolute knowledge. The certainty of the truth of reason proceeds directly and instinctively to discover itself. It becomes (a) observing reason; (b) realization of rational self-consciousness through itself; (c) individuality, which is real in and for itself. Observing reason applies itself (a) to nature; (b) to purity of self-consciousness and its relation to external reality; (c) to the immediate reality of self-consciousness. Objects of nature are described, arranged, and investigated, according to their laws. Inorganic as well as organic nature is appropriated by observation as rational. Reason observes—and so does self-consciousness in its purity—how it follows logical laws in thinking, and how it is subject to psychological laws in its development; for individuality, in its reciprocity with the circumstances which casually surround it, evolves nothing which was not involved in its instincts, propensities, and faculties. The great influence which is wont to be ascribed to circumstances is valid

only in so far as the individual admits and incorporates them into his activity. Hence in immediate reality as it appears in physiognomy and in the brain (or, since this cannot be directly perceived, in the skull), observation recognizes the existence of self-consciousness. The mental is one with the material, as brain and spinal marrow. Without brain, observing reason can find no self-consciousness, no thinking, no mind.

The antithesis of observation is the attempt of self-consciousness to realize the conception of reason through itself—not to find, but to produce, the reality of the conception. Hegel distinguishes here (*a*) pleasure and necessity; (*b*) the law of the heart, and the frenzy of self-conceit; (*c*) virtue, and the way of the world. Under the stand-point pleasure and necessity, he included that form of self-consciousness which reason seeks in the satisfaction of the appetites and passions in pleasure; but experiences that enjoyment has a limit, and that pleasure is contravened by necessity arising out of itself. Pleasure would make all a means of enjoyment; but the world, the Universal, is not to be consumed. The consciousness for which pleasure has decayed, seeks happiness in the heart; to make itself and all being happy, becomes its law. But the world, by its nature and its institutions, renders this high undertaking difficult; so that, as soon as it experiences this contradiction, the good heart in its self-conceit revolts to frenzy. Self-consciousness, therefore, concludes to renounce happiness, and to follow the law of the heart. In duty it recognizes law as general necessity, and is ready to sacrifice its individuality to it. Virtue must perform duty for its own sake. All inclination must be excluded. The Good exists only through virtue; if it be not realized, it is a mere thought. Virtue is thus brought into conflict with the way of the world, for the world, as such, is not virtuous. It guards individuality, and contends against vice only so far as it violates public law or becomes crime. Up to this limit individuality, even in its infirmities and vices, is allowed wide scope. Virtue revolts at the wickedness of the world, and spends itself in pompous delineations of its conflicts, its purity, its nobility, its incomparableness, its sacrifices. It thinks it very sad that virtue must so often

succumb. The vicious world, strange to relate, does not collapse, but preserves itself in tolerable order.

Individuality, by its varieties, produces manifoldness and interest. The world cannot dispense with it, nor indeed can virtue; for without it there can be nothing to contend against, nothing to be resigned to. Without the existence of temptation, of vice, the hero of virtue would have no cause for pride. Thus it is individuality which, by the resignation of virtue to it, has shown it itself preëminent. It is in and for itself real, i.e. it no longer seeks out of itself what it possesses within. In its immediacy it is indeed only natural individuality, but as the certainty of reason it appears (*a*) as animal kingdom of mind; (*b*) as law-giving; (*c*) as law-proving reason. As animal kingdom of mind, it produces itself in works in which it gives its peculiarity an objective expression. Such a work is not absolutely universal, for this it can represent only according to what individuality in its particularity is able to do; and therefore the latter modestly asserts that it intended merely a contribution to the Universal, and that it designed what was done to be referred not to itself, but to the subject. But the work also stands in relation to others who apprehend and judge of it. Since these are also individual ties, their judgment is also colored by this peculiarity, although they likewise modestly insist that not themselves, but the subject alone is concerned. Thus deception arises from both sides. The producer makes the subject his own, wishes to display himself in it—to put his own talent, culture, skill, mind to account. Thus not only the subject, but essentially he himself, is concerned in the work. The critic, on the other hand, rightly says that he must judge of the work as good, bad, or indifferent, only because the subject demands it; but, at the same time, the judgment is his, and expresses his penetration, erudition, taste, and mind. It is, therefore, his own individuality which comes into account in his judgment, and he deceives himself and others if he asserts that it remains neutral. When this deceit is recognized on both sides, consciousness ascends to that instance in which both producer and critic have to subject themselves to the conception of reason as law. Reason is the criterion which must be applied both to production and judgment. Reason gives laws, practical,

æsthetic, &c. But these numerous laws, which exist with and through each other, require in turn a demonstration of how far they are rational and at one with each other.

Law-proving reason seeks not, as it were, to annul laws, but to refine them by its critique, to liberate them from their isolation and one-sidedness, and imperfect construction, in order, in them, to become absolutely certain of the truth of reason. This is the result of the development of reason, i.e. of the stand-point of mind. Mind is self-certain of reason as its truth. It is (a) immediately the *true mind*, or the *morale*; (b) self-estranged mind, or culture; (c) mind certain of itself, or morality. To these conceptions Hegel limits the conception of mind, which he distinguishes from that of religion. True mind, as moral, appears, according to Hegel, (a) in the ethical world; (b) in ethical action; (c) in the condition of rights.

The moral world is immediately included in the family and the nation, for here freedom and necessity are indistinguishably one. Natural individuality, its external reality, pleasure and its limits, necessity, the good heart and its vanity, creative activity and criticism, law-giving and law-proving reason, are annulled in ethics. Man and woman as husband and wife, the latter as parents, parents as trainers of children, children as brother and sister, stand in spiritual relationship by virtue of their natural connection. Brother and sister sustain the purest relationship, because here the sexual passion is not concerned as it is between parents, after whose death the brother is the natural supporter and protector of the sister. All families are individual in one people. Only the princely family in its individuality is at the same time the collectivity of the state. The ethical act springs from the ethics of the people, in which the reason of mind is present. The law which animates the ethical appears partly as divine, partly as human; as divine in piety, which is especially cherished by woman, who is ordained by nature as guardian of the hearth; as human in the law of the state, whose prime guardian is the prince. Divine and human law may collide, which for the individual is his fate. He bears the guilt of his fate, but in it becomes conscious of the right which summoned him to the doing of his deed. He acted because, as a member

of the family or state, he could act only so, and not otherwise. Right itself, in turn, acquits him of his guilt and his wrong—as Orestes, Creon, Antigone, rightly did wrong, wrongly did right. The consciousness of right makes man a person, and in the atomic individualization of personality, ethical unity resolves itself into the multiplicity of the indifferent masses, which again can be held together only by a single person as a despotic power. Right is cold and egotistic as long as it seeks only to accomplish itself. When husband goes to law with wife, parents with children, brothers and sisters with each other, the spirit of the ethical has vanished. The individual insists on his right whatever consequences may follow, but just for this reason right is cold and regardless. Mind which is estranged from itself presents itself (*a*) in the world of its estrangement, partly as culture, partly as belief; (*b*) it becomes *éclaircissement* in that it opposes and makes an end of superstition; (*c*) in absolute freedom estrangement has the sense of self-renunciation for something other than we ourselves really are. The right of person inheres therein as far as in this act the entire will is expressed. The importance which the individual attains outside himself in society, depends upon whether he possess power or riches. Power is attained by state service; riches, by augmenting possessions. In the former, he acts nobly when he devotes his efforts and his activity, even to the sacrifice of his own life, to the state; in the latter, when his possessions, even to self-retrichment, are given up to benefit the poor. Still the state is not without distrust of those in power, who serve it, lest they misuse their power against it. The client, the pauper, is not without inner indignation that benefits must be presented to him. It seems to be chance that a person can elevate himself by means of power, riches, or indeed both—for power may lead to riches and riches to power—since individuality, as such, is originally a stranger no less to power and honor than to riches. It can lose as well as possess both.

Mind, therefore, seeks a possession which is inalienable from its individuality, and which can be affected by no mutations of power or riches. This possession is culture, which the individual gives himself. But culture is estrangement from his immediate naturalness, for it makes of man some-

thing other than he is by race, sex, &c. It raises him above the hazard of power or riches, for it is the self-consciousness of mind in its universality which can be snatched away by no fate. In cultured society the individual is significant, not because he is powerful or rich, but because he is cultured. Each signifies only what he has made of himself by culture. But there are of necessity different departments, grades, peculiarities, in culture; therefore it becomes its essential interest to set up a standard of culture for individuals, for just here is shown *how* one is cultured; for the criteria which one applies characterize the stand-point of his own culture. Judgments also become involved in contradiction; nay, one comes to appear talented by so much the less as he agrees with the judgment of others, or indeed with the judgment of the multitude. Thus arises a universal disintegration of mind, in which the chaos of various cultures and naturally contradictory judgments begets finally a chaotic confusion, above which only faith emerges, which subordinates culture as a vanity of the present. Before God is no respect of persons. Neither might, nor riches, nor culture, entitle one to blessedness; heaven demands from its own, not the evidence that they are talented, but the poor in spirit are blessed if they are pure in heart. But faith which is indifferent to it, agrees with culture in that it estranges the mind from immediate reality, for it transports it to the representation of a Beyond, of which, here, we can have no experience. In this fantastic world it is quite at home with its representations, and discerns that all must be just as it is.

The *éclaircissement* overtakes it nevertheless, because on the one side it clings to the supersensuous, yet on the other cannot deny that it wishes to find the supersensuous in the sensuous. *Eclaircissement* is the unavoidable product of culture which seeks satisfaction only in thought, and pushes forward faith with its double housekeeping in the present and in the Beyond. Faith, as genuine, does not think of making the sensuous the ground of blessedness, but it always contradicts itself by the weight which it lays upon the sensuous; for, in spite of its insight into the transitoriness of what is earthly, and the nothingness of what is external, it believes in sacred places, times, and pictures; it believes in sanctifi-

cation by washing, and by partaking of consecrated food and drink; by acts of sense, pilgrimages, fasts, scourgings, &c. It believes that eternal truth is contained in writings which have been preserved by chance, &c. Especially it represents the Beyond again in a form which is really only a copy of the human, of the Present. Its gods, angels, devils, have human shape. Angels play on harps, sing, &c. Faith revolts against this critique, which lacerates its very heart, just as the talented consciousness of culture revolts against its own distraction because the latter derisively expresses it.

Éclaircissement has its truth in the thought of the usefulness of things, for therein it attains the unity of being and of thought. Prosaic as the category of use may be, it still contains the thought of the end and aim for which things are present as means. It twines itself through all things as the bond which unites them to each other. All is useful. In nature, earth is useful to plants, plants to animals, animals to animals. All nature is useful to man, man to man; and even religion is useful, for it constrains man patiently to endure the pains of the Present in view of the future To Be.

The category of usefulness also contains the unity of thought and being of the idea and its reality, which, as deism and materialism, are widely separate; on the one hand, into the abstraction of a supreme essence, and into matter on the other. Its metaphysics knows only things and their properties; and among things, useful or natural, full as many have hurtful relations, for what is useful in one respect harms in the opposite; yet through this twofoldness of all things *éclaircissement* affirms the ever uniform stability of the world.

As the true, the moral mind is merged in the condition of right; so likewise the culture of the self-estranged mind is merged in absolute freedom and terror. The thinking of the *éclaircissement* has disposed of all, and has left to consciousness, at last, only the thinking of thinking, for *éclaircissement* supremely respects the logic of the understanding that twice two is four. If pure thinking would give itself a content, it must determine itself as will; but the will, conformably to the stand-point of thinking, will have to be a pure will, which wills itself in its universality. Yet since in its reality the will is always individual, universality as such can hold only a

negative relation to will when it wills to realize itself. It becomes a fanaticism which would exterminate the existing order of things. In so far as will assumes the form of government, the purpose of which is to care for the general well-being, and to realize the will of all, it becomes an object of suspicion to individuals, because as such they possess the possibility of dissenting from the will of the government which assumes the stand-point of universality. To meet the danger thus arising, nothing remains but to put such to death. But individuals conversely become objects of suspicion to government, because it is government that, in their determinations, they do not seek the pure will of all, but rather some special end. Government is therefore accused of being partisan, and its members in turn are executed. A new government is instituted, which in a short time succeeds no better. The terror of death is the result of absolute freedom, which detects slavery in every ethical relation, in family, rank, office; and fears, persecutes, and slays every individual who does not seem to come out into the colorless abstraction of freedom as absolute.

In the dissolution of the world of culture, the only stability is the mind's certainty of itself, or morality. The individual who ascends the scaffold, not because he has committed a crime, but because he has expressed an opinion other than absolute freedom has declared valid by the stamp of universality, dies with the certainty of having remained true to himself, of having acted correctly, morally. This certainly exalts him above death, and destroys the terror which it is said to inspire. The moral view of the world looks above the Present far beyond into a relationship in which all the contradictions of history shall be conciliated. In reality, to be sure, the highest good, the harmony of virtue with happiness, is not yet present, but is striven for as that which should be. If it had not to contend with vice, virtue would not be virtue. Without instincts, desires, passions, temptation, it would be without the material of conflict—would be an unemployed, inactive virtue. It should prosper externally, for through its exertions to overcome the allurements of vice it acquires a certain claim upon happiness; but experience shows that the virtuous often find the world very unfriendly, while the

vicious find it very comfortable. While, then, virtue, postulates happiness, although it confesses that in reality it by no means corresponds with the conception, its claim is no less unfounded than when the envy with which it looks askance at the prosperity of the vicious claims to be called virtuous. The moral order of the universe, according to Hegel, is a dissimulation [*verstellung*], which its bad conscience, that it is not really virtuous or free from sensuousness, conceals under the complaint of the difficulties which assail the virtuous, and against the course of the world when the bad thrive and the good suffer hardship. And yet conscience can in fact become self-certain, because it is determined not by feeling, but by the conception of duty which is clear and unambiguous. The new difficulty which now arises consists in the fact that duty which would perfect virtue as pure duty for its own sake, resolves self into a plurality of duties, so that although each individual is determined for himself, he may fall into doubt which to perform, or at least which to perform first. But in fulfilling one duty other duties may be violated, though it be only by omitting their performance. Hence, to act with perfect morality, it seems best not to act at all, for in so doing one stains himself in some way with finitude. By the determination of an act, no one can avoid exciting contradiction, or reaping blame. The fear of degrading its high ideal by expression in action, of soiling it by contact with vulgarity, drives back the æsthetic soul into itself to refresh itself in the purity of its inactivity, and with other æsthetic and congenial souls to fall into criticism of those who act and therefore err. The erring, however, who confesses his sin, thereby annihilates it. Should the æsthetic soul close itself against him, it would itself become wicked. It must pardon him who confesses his wickedness; for as he became wicked, so can he become good again. Thus the good must recognize the essence of equal freedom in the wicked, and, if he has confessed, cannot hard-heartedly hold itself aloof in privileged exclusiveness. The forgiveness of the wicked is the breaking through of religion, for it is the mind's act of majesty to make what has been done as though it were not done. In the act mind becomes conscious of its sovereignty over nature and history. The wickedness which I repent of, is as though it had not occurred.

I break off from my past, estrange myself from it, cast it from me as a nullity.

In religion, mind as human ascends to unity with the divine, to certainty of absolute truth; for this unity is truth. This sphere, in turn, begins as such from the bottom to build itself up, step by step, to perfection, viz. from the natural religion, through art-religion, to revealed religion. In natural religion, mind beholds the absolute still in natural existence, in the heavenly bodies, in plants, animals, until, as Hegel expresses it, like a master-workman, it encloses the hull of mind, its corpse, in the habitation which it has prepared for it out of stone. Buiding now becomes the *cultus*. With it, mind passes over to art-religion, which venerates the divine in the Beautiful, which it produces in statues of deities humanly beautiful, in the beautifully formed contestants at gymnastic sports, and in epic, lyric and dramatic poetry. In Phenomenology, Hegel has treated art only as religion, because it here simply gains the significance of the absolute, and in no sense serves as an ornament for prosaic ends, or as a means of recreation. But this æsthetic religion, after it has passed through the earnestness and pain of tragedy, dissolves into the frivolity and pleasure of comedy, after it has made all, even the gods of the nether world, its wanton sport. Now it becomes evident what mind is. Trust in the gods has vanished—the oracles are dumb—the altars empty—hymns are words without power—priests are needy, weak mortals like others—the statues of the gods are but cold figures to which Faith no more lends a soul—Consciousness shudders back into itself in this mental waste, and can no longer save itself from the despair of its absolute misfortune by the scorn of comic perversion. God can be found as the true God neither in nature nor in art, but reveals Himself as such only in the real man who knows that he is one with Him in self-consciousness. God has not only human form, is the æsthetic God, but becomes a man who can be felt, seen, heard. The absolute substance appears as an actual subject, which also really dies, i.e. the divine is the essence of the human self-consciousness; all disunion is extinguished in the Atonement.

Religion, therefore, already knows what truth is; but its knowledge is yet imperfect, for it has not yet the form of

pure self-consciousness, of the conception, but of intuition and representation. Indeed, revealed religion cannot yet detach itself from the sense-colored breadth of representation. It goes back into the past, or forward to the future. In the course of the year, on its festal days, it lives through the circle of its representatives in which truth presents itself to it in historical forms. It remains, therefore, to give to the absolute content absolute form. This is the final stand-point of phenomenally absolute knowledge, a beyond which has no passage to another, because in it not only truth but also certainty is posited as absolute. To elevate religious representation into the form of thought, is to *dissolve* it as representation; to dissolve does not mean to destroy its content, but to free it from its contradiction of representing the eternal in forms of adjacency and succession. That which should be absolutely conformable to self-consciousness, must be like itself pure idea, which, as absolute presence, is independent of time and space. Religious consciousness forgets itself momentarily in its representations, but falls back from them into itself again. Absolute knowledge conceives not only its object in and for itself, but it conceives itself also in its knowledge.

The position which Hegel has given to absolute knowledge, i.e. to speculative philosophy, became later the occasion of much opposition, since priests and theologians very naturally found in it an insufferable presumption which degraded religion to a "mere representation." We will here only remark that science cannot dispense with the critique of faith, and faith can assume no privileged immunity from being really thought. The particular science of faith struggles against being dissolved in the general science of nature and of mind; but really it cannot escape this fate, because this is necessarily involved in the relation between representation and thought. The miracles of faith are incomprehensible because they lack a rational nature. They can be represented, but not thought. Thought can find a general content symbolically expressed, an abiding truth; but, with this discovery, thought elevates its truth above its sensuous actuality, and transforms it into allegory. Miracles are to remain for faith an individual fact, which it devoutly gazes upon; for science,

they are to become a universality which is absolutely true.

When we glance back upon the Phenomenology in its totality, we must admit that it is a work which can be ranked in no traditional department, but at the same time we cannot refrain from the opinion that its greatness lies in its strangeness and uniqueness. An ordinary schoolmaster's understanding, which revolves with economical exactitude within the paragraphs of the text-book, never would have hit upon such a monstrosity. The mastership with which Hegel characterizes each particular stand-point of mind may pardon the occasional artifice of its deductions. His appositeness justifies, upon reflection, the apparent strangeness of his expression. When, e. g., Hegel calls culture the self-estranged mind, the word has acquired the partial meaning of confusion of mind, like the French word *aliéner*. All culture sustains a negative relation to our immediateness. We have in schools Greek and Latin, which we do not speak in life, but in which we estrange ourselves from our every-day reality; our companions travel among "strangers" in order to exalt themselves above the narrowness of home-life, &c. Hence the expression "estrangement" is quite right. Each new stand-point which consciousness enters upon is absolute for it so long as it deals with it; as, conversely, the world—in itself ever the same—is new for every new generation. It was with deep design that Hegel included the practical side of mind in the Phenomenology, a deduction of absolute knowledge from dogmatism and skepticism; realism and idealism would not have corresponded to the totality of mind. The forms of consciousness which Phenomenology exhibits in a long series, are constant elements of mind which lie between the extremes of sensuous certainty and absolute knowledge, and which hence always and everywhere reproduce themselves; in their individualization they may likewise modify the form of their appearance. Each is relatively the whole, but it is first in the absolutely free self-consciousness of spirit that it comprehends itself as the idea of truth. No one will deny that sensuous certainty and perception, that the conflict of self-consciousness for recognition, that stoicism and skepticism, that the efforts of the unhappy self-consciousness to solve the

contradiction between heaven and earth,—are stand-points which ceaselessly renew themselves among men. The case is the same with reason, which can never become weary of observing the nature of natural phenomena, in order therein to find itself. It has been supposed, in considering the laws of physiognomy, that Hegel intended, with Lichtenburg, to deride a presumptive science, and that only a transient mania of his time induced him to incorporate this matter; but the interest of mind to rediscover itself in the eternal reality of its form is constant. Our interest will always be excited in observing the physiognomy and cranial development of a Raphael, Schiller, Napoleon, Talleyrand, Socrates, and others, and therein tracing the expression of their minds. The realization of rational self-consciousness in pleasure and necessity, in the good heart and in the frenzy of conceit, or in virtue and the course of the world, astonishes us at first by the originality of its delineation; but it makes, nevertheless, a constant factor in the phenomenal knowledge of mind. Among the Greeks, e. g., it was the Cyrenian school which gave utterance to the experience that pleasure has its limits in necessity, and the Hegesians, who proceeded upon the attempt to constantly fulfil pleasure, concluded upon suicide because they found it impossible. The author of the *Koheleth*, among the Hebrews, expressed the same experience of the vanity of all things. Individuals ever repeatedly attempt to make pleasure their principle, but in the satisfaction of their desires they ever find the experience unavoidable, that in enjoyment they have subjected themselves to a necessity inseparable from pleasure. It is the same with the good heart and virtue in their one-sidedness and inexperience. When Hegel shows that virtue may be overcome by the course of the world, it may seem that he places no high estimate upon virtue, but only that virtue succumbs in the conflict with the course of the world, which wrongly estimates its own principle, the right of individuality, and regards its own sacrifice as the Absolute. Eating and drinking, sleeping and begetting of children, working and recreation from labor in sport, and the accumulation of property, will ever strike out new courses. The existence of monks and nuns presupposes as its condition the existence of the course of the world, from

which they retreat behind high walls. Individuality then makes its appearance as that which is real in and for itself. This stand-point also makes a constant element of the *becoming* mind, which produces itself as its object in what it creates, in which it deposits its entire peculiarity, but thereby calls out the judgment of other individualities. This "animal kingdom of mind," as Hegel sportively and wittily expresses himself, is likewise a constant element of history; and, to become convinced that this is the case, it is only necessary to read prefaces to books which are published, to find the assurance that their authors are concerned only in their respective subject-matter, to which they offer their modest contribution, or, on the other hand, to read the critiques of books in which the reviewers assert, with praise or blame, that they are concerned only about the subject-matter. Law-giving and law-proving reason are constantly present in the constitutional conflicts of states. It is proposed, for instance, to abolish the death penalty; the law is subjected to criticism, the grounds which sustain the proposition are examined, &c., whether they are in accordance with reason.

In the description of mind it has been said that Hegel at first had before his eyes the Hellenic ethics as Æschylus and Sophocles depicted it, but in the dissolution of the true ethical mind in the legal condition which strengthens the egoism of persons, the Roman empire. Then he makes the process of the estrangement of mind complete itself in Feudalism and Catholicism; but the culture of humanism, on the other hand, reacts in *éclaircissement*, and absolute freedom culminates in the terrorism of the French revolution. In the stand-point of morality he alludes to the dualism of German philosophy in the Fair Saint, especially to Jacobi's ALL-WILL and Waldemar. It may be unhesitatingly granted that from the phases of history he derived his colors for these stand-points, but it does not follow that these are not constant elements in all history. Hegel depicts—in the act of the ethical mind—e. g. blood revenge, with unmistakable reference to Orestes and Œdipus; but blood revenge is a constant element of the ethical in the family, among all peoples who are making the transition from the sphere of their natural condition to that of the state. The Arab who avenges the

death of his father, is in this respect as ethical as Orestes. That Hegel opposes right, as private right, to the ethical, is likewise to be understood generally, although Roman jurisprudence carried out the conception of personal atomism most perfectly. When children as heirs of their patrimony do not quarrel about their respective shares, but seek to terminate the strife by judicial decision, the very spirit of the ethical has vanished. Even Aristophanes, in his comedies, attacked the bad disposition of the citizens, who became entangled in their private interests and their lawsuits about *meum* and *tuum*, and allowed the ancient virtue of Marathon, which guided itself in view of the whole, to fall into decay. Culture in a distinct sense, where the word denotes primitive civilization, is also a constant element among all people, who, by reverence of the power of the state, or by the splendor of riches, have elevated themselves above the significance of the individual, to self-consciousness of mind. When Hegel here, in characterizing the peculiar distraction to which this standpoint leads, borrows a few features from Diderot's dialogue, *Rameau's Nephew*, one must not be so narrow as to believe that he thought only of the intellectual French society of the 18th century. This language, which levels all difference of station; which expresses with spirit all the phenomena of mind, even the most depraved; which discloses with shameless publicity all the contradictions of mind,—attracts interest to itself whenever the individual, by way and manner of speaking, attests that he is a man of culture, and when comparison of tendency of independence and of degree of culture is the chief topic of the general discourse. Lucian among the Greeks, Petronius among the Romans, Heine among the Germans, discover a language similar to that of Diderot among Frenchmen. *Eclaircissement* is no less a constant element of history, for it arises from culture. The Sankhya philosophy of the Indians is an *éclaircissement* of their Mythology. The doctrine of the sophists was an *éclaircissement* among the Greeks, as in modern times the movement of the 17th and 18th centuries. Over against the popular belief of the Greeks, Plato with his critique of their Mythology appeared as an apostle of *éclaircissement*, and, like those in England, France and Germany, would substitute morals in its place.

The stand-point of absolute freedom, i.e. of that freedom which wills the will only as universal, may seem to be so designated by Hegel as though only the first French revolution hovered before him; but in itself this form of consciousness is a constant element of history, where democratic and communistic tendencies pass over into fanaticism. This element was present in the German peasant war, among the English Puritans, and the social reformers of the Paris revolution of February, as well as among the Jacobins, who overthrew the Girondists. Morality is depicted with extraordinary accuracy by Hegel; no one can doubt that here he detects one of the most general stand-points of mind: but the turn which Hegel gives to it—viz. in making religion, or the certainty of the unity of the human and divine mind, to emerge from the wicked man's confession of guilt and from his pardon—may seem peculiar. Otherwise, morality appears as that inclination which religion absorbs in itself, as private right absorbs the æsthetic *morale* (ethical condition). But morality has exalted itself above this stand-point; and now Hegel shows how mind, apprehending itself in conscience, passes over from the isolation of its self-certainty, through pardon of the wicked, to the truth of the community. This is one of his most profound and beautiful developments. That religion is construed as a constant element of mind is of course self-evident, and the question can only arise how far the differences between natural religion, art-religion, and revealed religion, are constant. This question is answered by the fact that every man must in childhood pass through the stages of fetichism and pantheism, which compose the essence of natural religion. Even if people existed no longer in a state of nature, still the contemplation of nature in sun, moon, plants, and animals, would precede the representation of a creative God, even for children who grew up within the pale of a revealed religion. Children often sustain the same relation to animals which men in a state of nature do in animal worship. Hegel treated art-religion in general as the presentation of art, because only as religion does it make the beautiful a pure Absolute. Art lies without as a moment in the stand-points of production and culture. The beautiful is now, to be sure, the absolute in respect to

form, but only the æsthetic stand-point sublimates the truth of the absolute and must subordinate itself to it, as occurs in revealed religion, which makes art a means in its *cultus*. Roman Catholicism, in architecture, sculpture, music, and poesy, has produced as excellent works of art as the Greek art-religion, but religion as such has ever distinguished itself from these works even when superstition has confounded them.

Finally, absolute knowledge exists in all philosophical endeavor as a constant element, for philosophy must strive for such a certainty of truth that even the formal side of knowledge may be complete, that certainty may become true, and truth certain. Philosophy is, therefore, capable of endless development, since neither its breadth nor the depth of knowledge can have a limit. That all moments of the experience of consciousness make up constituent elements of mind, Hegel distinctly affirms in saying that phenomenology has the same content as a system of science. The latter is not power, nor is it riches. The difference lies in the fact that that which phenomenology presents as a stand-point of phenomenal knowledge in the relation between consciousness and its object, so that knowledge during its becoming does not conceive itself until by its mutation it has arrived at a result, although we who observe its process can apprehend it before it becomes clear to itself—that this appears in the system as a pure, organic conception, no longer confused with consciousness.

The sequence of the conceptions is in general the same in both spheres, although with the difference which is conditioned by the nature of consciousness. In the history of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, mind, religion, and absolute knowledge, follow in order; but in history many modifications occur through freedom, chance, arbitrariness, which are eliminated from the necessity of the system. The stand-point of natural religion, e.g., may be interrupted by the violent intrusion of revealed religion; for what wide extremes may be united in consciousness! Take a New Zealander of to-day, as he may be seen and spoken to in London, who in his youth has participated in cannibal feasts, but is now converted to Methodist Christianity. Thirty or forty years ago he ate human flesh, now at the Lord's table he partakes of the body and

blood of Christ. An important point of the succession is that each higher stand-point elevates each lower into itself, and reduces it to a moment which disappears in itself. That which in an earlier stage had absolute significance for consciousness, loses it in the higher. The most earnest occupations of earlier ages, as Hegel expresses it, sink in an advanced stage to be childish plays. It might be asked whether many of the elements which Hegel adduces have not now entirely vanished. Under art-religion, for example, he speaks of living art-work, and understands thereby the reverence in which the Greeks held beauty, and the strength and suppleness of the human body. The Greeks, indeed, deified beautiful men because they were beautiful. This element exists among us no longer as a religion. We build temples to no man now because he is beautiful, but in the circus we admire the beauty, strength, and gymnastic virtuosity, of the human body, i.e. the living art-work. It is degraded to a mere moment of secularity, but it is not wanting. The successive connection of the forms of consciousness, which advances from sensuous certainty to absolute knowledge, is therefore necessary. If we have attained a certain grade of consciousness we must advance to philosophy; and hence, not only in Greece but in China and India, not only among Christians but among Mohamedans, not only among Europeans but among Americans, we see philosophers arise; for even the practical, gain-seeking, pure utilitarianism of the Yankees has not prevented the appearance among them of a Parker, an Emerson.

Hegel preceded his *Phenomenology* by an extended preface, in which he defined his relation to the dominant views respecting the essence and method of philosophy still more distinctly than in the introduction to his article concerning the difference between the systems of Fichte and Schelling. He strongly contended, moreover, against the degeneracy of Schelling's philosophy, which among many of its adherents had sunk to a mere formalism, and which sought to conceal the want of scientific earnestness partly by fantastic decoration, and partly by the assumption of dictatorial impertinence and prophetic unction. Hegel contended no less against the insipidity of *éclaircissement*, which sought a narrow satis-

faction in the temporal, than against the pseudo-geniality of romanticism, which was designed to supersede the pains and the thoroughness of learning, by simple inspiration. He gave a careful critique of the method of the scientific knowledge, which, with precipitate construction according to superficial antitheses, is not adequate to the task. The truest method, he affirms, is the dialectic, which makes the negative an immanent moment of development, because negation is not only negative, but at the same time positive; for its result is not pure nullity, but rather a higher determination, in which that which was denied is ideally preserved. Nothing is lost to this method, but it enriches itself, in its progress from negation to negation, by an equal number of positions. He expresses this thought in such a manner as to affirm that the philosopher must entirely abstract from himself, and in the movement of conception reserve for himself only the attitude of a spectator. "Substance must be grasped as subject";—with these words, which have become so full of fate for his philosophy, he would indicate that the idea for itself is independent; that, although we think it, it determines itself entirely independent of us, and that its relation to other ideas can really proceed only from it and not from us. When, e.g., we think the idea of identity, it, and not we, is the ground that the next idea is that of difference. It is not we who determine identity to difference, but identity determines itself to difference, for difference has a meaning only as difference of identity. The idea of identity moves, therefore, of itself to its opposite idea, to difference, and leaves to the philosopher only the observation of this process.

It is, in fact, the original sense of the word that substance in itself is subject. Substance here signifies the essential content, subject the form of knowledge. The subject must here be not the knowing philosopher, but the idea itself. Still the philosopher is also the subject which thinks the idea, but his thinking is not bound to the self-determination of the idea, into which the philosopher, with absolute renunciation of his own individual subjectivity, must think himself. Hegel's thought may be thus explained: In common logic, it is said that in judgment we join a predicate to a subject. In this the subject appears as passive, and receives the

predicate through us. According to this logic, it is we who bind the predicate to the subject by the copula. Hegel reverses the matter by saying that it is the subject which determines itself to its predicate; for, if this be not the case, it is in vain that we join a predicate to a subject, because the judgment can be only in so far true as the predicate either inheres in the subject as a casual and relative determination, or is immanent in it as a necessary and absolute *natura sua*. When I judge, "This circle is large," this judgment is true only in so far as greatness inheres in it. But greatness is only a relative determination in the relation of this circle to others. A circle may just as well be relatively small. If I judge, "The circle is a self-enclosed curve," this judgment is a necessary, absolute one, for without this determination the circle would not be a circle. Thus it is the idea of a circle itself that immanently determines itself to its predicate. It is not I who produce this idea, but the idea which produces itself in me. The predicate of the subject circle, by which it is a circle, does not depend upon me. I recognize it, I utter it, I make it my object; but I do not produce it. But the circle, because it is a circle, produces itself in the object.

By the example which I have just chosen, I am reminded that, in the preface of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel would make of mathematics merely a science of the understanding, partly because its content, space in geometry, and unity in arithmetic, is so meagre, and partly because the construction of mathematics turns upon formal identity. A synthetic or an analytic course rather than the dialectic must be referred to mathematics. But when, as Hegel affirms, truth can become certain of itself only in the form of dialectic method; when further, according to him, mathematics forms a necessary member in the system of science; when, finally, it is the conception of space with which the idea as nature first found its existence,—it is hard to see why mathematics should be an exception to all other content. That it never has been, is no reason why it never should be treated dialectically. The conception of the one of quantity, &c., i.e. of arithmetic, Hegel has already presented dialectically in the first part of his *Logic*: "Why should geometry dispense with the dialectic?" Quantity does not even exclude qualitative distinctions, but

is partly a moment of them and partly qualitatively distinguished in itself; for an arithmetical progression, e.g., is not only qualitatively different from a geometrical progression, or the acute angle is not only quantitatively but qualitatively different from an obtuse angle. The one is smaller, the other larger, than a right angle; and just for this reason they are opposites in form. The lack of rational nature [*begriffslosigkeit*], which Hegel charges upon quantity, is only relative. Through the integral and differential calculus, and through descriptive geometry, modern mathematics has in fact already become dialectic.

Hegel believed that an example of the dialectic method was afforded in the *Phenomenology* itself. Without boasting, yet with profound self-feeling, he expressed in the preface the consciousness of having found that method which the future would confirm as the only true one. Though it be acknowledged that he is right, that henceforth without the dialectic method philosophy would no longer be in a condition to satisfy the conceptions of science, and that it no less than others cannot submit to an arbitrary treatment; still it cannot be denied that the method is open to great danger, and that it no less than others may degenerate to arbitrary treatment. The philosopher shall remain out of the question. The idea shall determine itself through itself, shall adopt nothing into itself from without. This is the postulate. It is, indeed, justified; but, in fine, it is the philosopher even here who advances with his thoughts as thinking subject from conclusion to conclusion, and what he holds to be a necessary correlation describes as such. Just this description is the most dangerous moment, for its extent, its tone, its address, remains more dependent upon the philosopher than its form would indicate. Experience has subsequently shown that the descriptive manner of the Hegelian school, especially through imitation of the *Phenomenology*, degenerated into a mere assertory procedure, which was in no respect better than the polarities of Schelling's philosophy, the antitheses and syntheses of Fichte's, or the categories of Kant. The dialectic, which was to have engendered the most active self-movement of science, stiffened into the most arbitrary and lifeless dogmatism, which often became the more contradic-

tory the more it set up pretension to absolute infallibility. If the application of the dialectic method had been guarded from every error, Hegel himself, for instance, would not have set the example of altering the position of ideas in his system. Without the Logic, the danger would have become still greater.

For profound penetration into the essence of science, for sharp criticism of the delusions behind which scientism has taken refuge in order to preserve itself in the public mart as authority, for noble dignity of scientific temper, for spirited apprehension of the entire turning-point of the age,—the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology* can only be compared with that which Kant introduced in the second edition of his *Critique of Reason*. This is its counterpart in literature.

THE LOGICAL QUESTION IN HEGEL'S SYSTEM.

Translated from the German of TRENDLENBURG, by THOS. DAVIDSON.

[*Continued from our last number.*—ED.]

In the first place, the *Negation* is the inborn impulse which drives pure thinking along from stage to stage. No sooner is a concept produced than it turns over, from its own inner nature, into its negation, and we have before us the problem of thinking a positive and a negative together. This problem is solved by the creation of a mediatory concept which reconciles the two antitheses. Thus the progress of the *Dialectic* is conditioned by the *Negation*.

The investigation showed that the applied negation cannot be a pure logical negation, the relation of *not-A* to *A*, but that it must be real opposition in order to produce a *Contrary*—an *Opposition*. But since the *Contrary* does not run off into indefinite contradiction or opposition, into mere unlimited negation, but is on the contrary another *Positive*, which, concrete and limited in itself, contains the negation of Another [somewhat] only as one relation, it became apparent at once that the real opposition—the negation of the *Dialectic*—was not to be reached in any merely logical way. Not only